



Framing State Survival: A Systematic Document Analysis of Puntland's 2026 Diplomatic Appeal to the United Nations Security Council

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ABSTRACT

Background: Relations between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Puntland State have deteriorated sharply since 2023. Puntland withdrew recognition of the federal institutions in March 2024, and in March 2026 a new federal constitution extended federal terms from four to five years, a change Puntland rejects. On 13 September 2026, Puntland's Office of the President addressed a letter to the UN Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council setting out its grievances and six requests ahead of the Council's October 2026 deliberations on Somalia.

Objectives: This study analyses how the letter frames Puntland's political situation, what it asks the Security Council to do, and whether those requests are legally, politically, and operationally feasible within the Council's existing decisions on Somalia.

Methods: A systematic document analysis was conducted following Bowen's procedure and the READ approach, and reported against the CARDA checklist. The letter was coded deductively using four framing functions. Each request was then assessed against a contextual corpus of Security Council resolutions, official statements, and contemporaneous reporting published between December 2023 and September 2026.

Results: The letter frames the crisis as a problem of state survival: it defines the problem as the erosion of the federal system since 2023, attributes it to federal centralisation and the arming of rival actors, casts Puntland as a reliable counter-terrorism and counter-piracy partner, and prescribes six remedies. Measured against the Council's calendar, most remedies face low feasibility. The Council has already decided that the UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) will cease operations on 31 October 2026, and renewed a streamlined Panel of Experts only until 31 December 2026. Somalia itself holds an elected Council seat until the end of 2026. Support for inclusive dialogue and restoration of the Panel of Experts are the most attainable requests.

Conclusions: The letter functions less as a realistic policy package than as an act of sub-state diplomacy that seeks to shape how the Council, the penholder, and regional organisations understand Somalia's crisis. Its implicit exit signal raises the stakes of inaction. A phased response that prioritises mediated dialogue, uses the December 2026 sanctions renewal to strengthen monitoring, and independently investigates contested airstrikes offers the most viable path.

Keywords: Puntland; Somalia; federalism; UN Security Council; framing analysis; sub-state diplomacy; document analysis; arms embargo; UNTMIS

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Somalia has struggled to build a durable state since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. Federalism, adopted in 2004 and implemented from 2012 under the Provisional Constitution, was intended to end civil war



and preserve national unity by distributing power among a federal government and Federal Member States (FMS) (Dahir, 2021). Puntland, which established itself as an autonomous state in 1998, predates that constitutional framework and regards itself as a founding pillar of Somali federalism; its founders saw federalism as protection against the re-emergence of an authoritarian centre (Small Wars Journal, 2025).

Federal–state relations have repeatedly broken down. Puntland withdrew its recognition of the federal institutions on 31 March 2024, after the federal parliament amended the first four chapters of the Provisional Constitution (The Somali Digest, 2026). The dispute intensified in March 2026, when parliament adopted, and the President signed into law on 8 March, a new constitution that extends federal terms from four to five years (The Standard, 2026). Puntland, Jubaland, and the opposition Somali Future Council maintain that the federal parliament’s mandate expired on 14 April 2026 and the President’s on 15 May 2026, whereas the FGS holds that both terms run until 15 May 2027 (Dawan Africa, 2026; The East African, 2026).

Against this background, Puntland’s Office of the President sent a letter dated 13 September 2026 to Secretary-General António Guterres and to the President of the Security Council, describing it as an advance briefing for the Council’s expected discussion of Somalia in October (Garowe Online, 2026). Copies were sent to Council members, to the United Kingdom as penholder on Somalia, to senior UN officials, to the African Union, and to IGAD (The Somali Digest, 2026). The Council presidency in September 2026 was held by France, represented by Ambassador Jérôme Bonnafont (United Nations, 2026).

1.2 Rationale

The letter merits systematic analysis for three reasons. First, it is the most comprehensive public statement of Puntland’s position since the 2026 constitutional dispute began, and it is addressed directly to the organ with primary responsibility for international peace and security. Second, it makes six concrete requests, several of which would reverse decisions the Council has already taken. Third, it signals, through reference to domestic pressure for independence, that Puntland’s continued commitment to a federal Somalia is conditional (The Somali Digest, 2026). Understanding how the letter constructs this argument is as important as assessing whether its requests can be met.

1.3 Aim and Research Questions

This study aims to analyse how Puntland frames its situation in the letter and to assess the feasibility of its requests. Three research questions guide the analysis:

- RQ1: How does the letter frame the problem, its causes, the moral standing of the actors involved, and the remedies sought?
- RQ2: How do the six requests align with or diverge from existing Security Council decisions on Somalia?
- RQ3: What are the legal, political, and operational implications of the requests for the Council, the FGS, and Puntland?

1.4 Contribution

The study contributes to scholarship on Somali federalism and on sub-state diplomacy by treating a single diplomatic appeal as a strategic text rather than as a simple list of demands. Methodologically, it offers a transparent, replicable template for combining framing analysis with feasibility assessment of diplomatic correspondence addressed to multilateral bodies.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Somalia’s Federal Project

Somalia’s federalism emerged as a political compromise after state collapse rather than as a settled national



consensus. Field research across the federal member states finds that many Somalis view federalism as an external imposition and prefer decentralisation, and that the project has not met expectations of stabilising the country or curbing abuses of power (Dahir, 2021). Studies of intergovernmental relations point to weak cooperation mechanisms between the federal and state levels as a recurring source of political deadlock (Hashi & Barasa, 2023). Policy research by Somali Public Agenda and the Puntland Development and Research Centre identifies strained federal–state relations, the incomplete constitutional review, and the electoral model as the three most pressing unresolved questions (Somali Public Agenda & PDRC, 2025).

2.2 Puntland's Trajectory

Puntland combines modern state institutions with clan-based legitimacy, having been established primarily as a homeland for the Harti clan confederation (Small Wars Journal, 2025). Its recent military campaign against the Islamic State affiliate in the Cal Miskaad mountains has strengthened its standing with external partners while widening its rift with Mogadishu, an outcome attributed to counter-terrorism partnerships that prioritise kinetic results over national political cohesion (Small Wars Journal, 2025). More broadly, research on the greater Somali economy shows that governing flows of goods, ports, and trade corridors has been central to making and unmaking Somali state entities, which helps explain why control over revenue, resources, and external partnerships is so contested between Mogadishu and the member states (Hagmann & Stepputat, 2023).

2.3 From Cooperation to Confrontation

The federal–Puntland dispute has regional as well as constitutional dimensions. In April 2024, after Ethiopia's memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, the FGS expelled Ethiopia's ambassador and ordered the closure of Ethiopian consulates in Garowe and Hargeisa within seven days (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 2024). The 2026 constitution then turned a long-running disagreement over the constitutional review into a dispute over the legitimacy of federal institutions themselves (The Standard, 2026; The East African, 2026). In June 2026, President Said Abdullahi Deni stated that Puntland would act independently until a consensus-based federal government is formed, while insisting it had never abandoned the federal system, Abdillahi, M. M. (2026).

2.4 The Security Council Framework

Three Council decisions define the context for the letter. Resolution 2714 (2023) lifted the general arms embargo on the Federal Government of Somalia in December 2023, while a separate regime targeting al-Shabaab was retained (UN Security Council, 2023; The Somali Digest, 2026). Resolution 2806 (2025), adopted on 12 December 2025, renewed the al-Shabaab arms embargo and the Panel of Experts until 31 December 2026, in a streamlined form with five experts instead of six, and set a notification arrangement for deliveries to member states (UN Security Council, 2025a; The Somali Digest, 2026). Resolution 2809 (2025), adopted unanimously on 23 December 2025, reauthorised the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) until 31 December 2026 with up to 11,826 uniformed personnel, and decided that UNTMIS would cease all operations on 31 October 2026 (UN Security Council, 2025b).

A further structural fact shapes the Council's response: Somalia won an elected seat in June 2024 and has sat on the Council since 1 January 2025, holding the rotating presidency in January 2026 (The Somali Digest, 2026). During the December 2025 negotiations, Somalia and its A3 Plus partners reportedly pressed to narrow the sanctions regime and to route weapons deliveries to member states through federal approval (The Somali Digest, 2026).

2.5 Theoretical Framework: Framing and Sub-state Diplomacy

This study draws on two complementary perspectives. First, framing theory holds that to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication, so as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993). These four functions provide a deductive coding frame for analysing how the letter constructs its case (RQ1). Securitization theory adds that actors can present an issue as an existential threat to justify



extraordinary measures (Buzan et al., 1998), which helps interpret the letter's language of survival and collapse.

Second, the literature on sub-state or regional diplomacy explains why a federal member state would address the Security Council directly. Regions pursue international activity for political, economic, and cultural motives, shaped by the opportunities and constraints of their domestic and international setting (Keating, 1999), and such activity has become an increasingly normal feature of international relations (Cornago, 2010). Where external recognition is at stake, the support of powerful international actors is decisive for whether secessionist entities achieve statehood (Coggins, 2011). Together, these perspectives suggest that Puntland's letter should be read both as a set of requests and as an attempt to shape how external audiences understand Somalia's crisis.

2.6 Gap in the Literature

Existing work has examined Somali federalism, Puntland's state-building, and the Security Council's Somalia mandates largely in isolation. No study has systematically analysed Puntland's 2026 letter as a strategic text, nor assessed its requests against the Council's fixed decision calendar. This study addresses that gap.

3. METHODS

3.1 Design

The study uses a systematic qualitative document analysis, following Bowen's (2009) procedure of skimming, reading, and interpreting documents, and the four steps of the READ approach: ready materials, extract data, analyse data, and distil findings (Dalglish et al., 2020). Reporting follows the CARDA checklist for document analysis (Cleland et al., 2023). This design replaces a PRISMA-style systematic review, which is intended for synthesising multiple studies and is poorly suited to the close analysis of a single primary document.

3.2 Document Corpus

The **primary document** is the letter dated 13 September 2026 from the Office of the President of Puntland to the UN Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council. The **contextual corpus** comprised: (a) Security Council resolutions on Somalia adopted between December 2023 and December 2025; (b) official statements by the FGS and UN bodies; (c) contemporaneous news reporting and analysis of the letter published in September 2026; and (d) peer-reviewed and grey literature on Somali federalism and Puntland. Documents were included if they were publicly available in English and directly relevant to the letter's claims or to the Council decisions it addresses. Opinion pieces without an evidentiary basis were excluded. Appendix A lists the corpus.

3.3 Coding and Analysis

Analysis proceeded in two stages. In the first, the letter was coded deductively using Entman's (1993) four framing functions, with inductive sub-codes developed for recurring themes such as mandate legitimacy, partner-supplied firepower, and the conditional exit signal (Appendix B). Coding followed the thematic analysis procedure of Braun and Clarke (2006). In the second stage, each of the six requests was assessed against three criteria:

- **Legal feasibility:** whether the Security Council has competence to grant the request under the UN Charter and its existing resolutions.
- **Political feasibility:** the likelihood of Council agreement, given members' positions, including Somalia's own seat, and the FGS's stance.
- **Operational feasibility:** whether the request can be implemented within existing mandates, timelines, and resources.



Each criterion was rated Low, Medium, or High, and an overall rating was assigned by judgement, weighting political feasibility most heavily because Council action depends on agreement among its members.

3.4 Source Assessment and Reflexivity

The primary document was assessed for authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning (Bowen, 2009; Cleland et al., 2023). The letter is an authentic official communication whose existence, date, addressees, and six requests are consistently reported by multiple independent outlets (Garowe Online, 2026; Hiiraan Online, 2026; Horseed Media, 2026; The Somali Digest, 2026). It is, however, an advocacy document: several of its factual allegations, including Turkish responsibility for coastal strikes and attribution of the Doolow strike, have not been independently verified and are contested (Hiiraan Online, 2026). The analysis therefore treats the letter's factual claims as claims, and distinguishes them from facts verified through Council documents. The study was conducted by a single coder, which is acknowledged as a limitation.

4. RESULTS

4.1 Document Overview

The letter is dated 13 September 2026 and addressed to Secretary-General António Guterres and the President of the Security Council. It opens with Puntland's account of events in Galkayo in August 2026, where, according to the letter, weapons were flown into the Galmudug-administered south of the city for transfer to the Puntland-administered north; Puntland reports that its forces arrested 101 people and seized weapons and vehicles (The Somali Digest, 2026). It reports that Puntland has fought the Islamic State in the Cal Miskaad mountains for two years without federal support, that 19 piracy incidents have occurred in 2026 with five vessels still held, and it alleges that Turkish forces struck the Jiifle and Garmaal coastline on 18 and 20 August, killing 14 Somalis (The Somali Digest, 2026). It also references a 3 September drone strike on a residence in Doolow and asks the Council to investigate the use of air power in Somali political disputes (ChimpReports, 2026). The letter closes by recommitting Puntland to a stable, peaceful, democratic, and federal Somalia (The Somali Digest, 2026).

4.2 How the Letter Frames the Crisis (RQ1)

Table 1 summarises how the letter performs each of Entman's (1993) four framing functions, and Figure 1 shows how they combine into an overarching frame of state survival.

Table 1. Framing functions in Puntland's 13 September 2026 letter

Framing function	How the letter performs it	Illustrative content
Problem definition	The federal system, not merely a bilateral relationship, is under threat.	Erosion of the federal system since 2023; expired federal mandates; warning that the election dispute could produce a "parallel government" in Mogadishu.
Causal diagnosis	Responsibility is attributed to the FGS's centralising and coercive conduct.	Support for rival authorities and armed groups inside Puntland; the August Galkayo weapons transfer; the use of partner-supplied military capabilities in domestic disputes.
Moral evaluation	Puntland is positioned as a responsible partner; the FGS as a spoiler.	Two years of fighting the Islamic State without federal support; counter-piracy efforts; commitment to a federal Somalia.
Remedy	The Council is asked to act directly and to engage member states.	Six requests (D1–D6): dialogue, dual-track support, Panel of Experts, arms restrictions, UNTMIS, accountability.

Source: Author's coding of the letter as reported in Garowe Online (2026), Horseed Media (2026), and The Somali Digest (2026).




Figure 1. The letter's framing structure: four framing functions nested within an overarching frame of state survival.

Two features of the framing stand out. First, the letter securitises the political dispute: by linking the electoral quarrel to counter-terrorism, piracy, and arms diversion, it presents the constitutional crisis as a threat to international security rather than an internal matter, which is the condition for Council engagement (Buzan et al., 1998). Second, it pairs a claim of loyalty with a conditional exit signal. In the Somali-language rendering of the same message, President Deni stated that some Puntland residents are pressing for independence because the Somali project has stalled (The Somali Digest, 2026). The signal raises the cost of inaction for external audiences while preserving Puntland's formal commitment to federalism.

4.3 Feasibility of the Six Requests (RQ2)

Table 2 and Figure 2 summarise the feasibility assessment. The key finding is that most requests collide with dates the Council has already fixed: UNTMIS closes on 31 October 2026, the Council intends to review the Panel of Experts by 30 November, and AUSSOM, the Panel, and Somalia's Council seat all expire on 31 December 2026 (The Somali Digest, 2026).

Table 2. Feasibility of Puntland's six requests

#	Request	Legal	Political	Operational	Overall
D1	Support an urgent, inclusive Somali dialogue on a transitional electoral roadmap	High	Low–Med	Medium	Medium
D2	Direct (“dual-track”) support to Puntland and other member states	Medium	Low	Medium	Low–Med
D3	Restore the Panel of Experts' full mandate and resources	High	Low–Med	High	Medium
D4	Review, tighten, or reimpose arms restrictions on Somalia	High	Low	Low	Low
D5	Extend the UNTMIS mandate beyond 31 October 2026	High	Low	Low	Low
D6	Council action on accountability, governance, and resource management	Medium	Low	Low	Low

Note: Ratings are the author's judgement based on the evidence in Sections 4.4–4.9.

	Legal	Political	Operational	Overall
D1 Inclusive political dialogue	High	Low-Med	Medium	Medium
D2 Dual-track support to FMS	Medium	Low	Medium	Low-Med
D3 Restore Panel of Experts	High	Low-Med	High	Medium
D4 Tighten/reimpose arms restrictions	High	Low	Low	Low
D5 Extend UNTMIS mandate	High	Low	Low	Low
D6 Accountability mechanisms	Medium	Low	Low	Low

Figure 2. Feasibility heat map of the six requests (darker = more feasible).

4.4 D1: Inclusive Political Dialogue

Puntland asks the Council to support an urgent, inclusive Somali dialogue backed by international mediation, leading to an agreed electoral roadmap (ChimpReports, 2026; Garowe Online, 2026). The Council can call for dialogue under Chapter VI of the Charter through a resolution, presidential statement, or press statement, so legal feasibility is high. Political feasibility is constrained because the request rests on the premise that federal mandates have expired, which the FGS rejects (Dawan Africa, 2026), and Somalia can shape any Council product from its seat. The request is nonetheless reinforced by the opposition Somali Future Council, which on 11 September asked the Secretary-General for a UN-backed mediator and guarantor (The Somali Digest, 2026). Operationally, the closure of UNTMIS on 31 October will reduce the UN's in-country capacity for good offices.

4.5 D2: Dual-track Support

Puntland calls for a return to a “dual-track” approach under which donors would provide security, humanitarian, and economic assistance directly to the regional administration rather than routing all support through Mogadishu (Horseed Media, 2026). This request is directed as much at bilateral donors as at the Council. The Council's own resolutions are framed around the federal government, and in December 2025 Somalia pressed for federal approval of deliveries to member states (The Somali Digest, 2026), so Council endorsement is unlikely. Individual donors can, however, fund programmes in Puntland without a Council decision, which keeps operational feasibility at a medium level.

4.6 D3: Restoring the Panel of Experts

Puntland asks the Council to restore the Panel of Experts' mandate and resources so that it can report on weapons flows, criminal connections, and terrorist networks (Garowe Online, 2026). It might appear that this request is already satisfied, but it is not. Resolution 2806 (2025) renewed the Panel only until 31 December 2026, and in a streamlined form with five experts rather than six (The Somali Digest, 2026). The request is therefore best read as a call to reverse that narrowing when the Panel is next renewed. The Council plainly has the competence to do so and the Panel already exists, but Somalia and its partners argued for less scrutiny in December 2025, making the renewal a contested but live decision point.

4.7 D4: Arms Restrictions

This is the most far-reaching request. Puntland asks the Council to review and tighten arms restrictions on Somalia, which several outlets report as a call to reimpose the embargo lifted in December 2023 (Hiiraan



Online, 2026; Somali News Today, 2026). The Council has clear Chapter VII authority to reimpose measures, so legal feasibility is high. Politically, however, reversing Resolution 2714 against the wishes of a sitting Council member and a government that security partners are actively arming is highly improbable. A more attainable intermediate option is to strengthen notification, marking, and Panel monitoring of deliveries to prevent diversion, which addresses Puntland's concern about partner-supplied capabilities being used in domestic disputes.

4.8 D5: *Extending UNTMIS*

Puntland asks the Council to extend UNTMIS beyond its scheduled closure (Horseed Media, 2026). An extension might appear uncontroversial, but the evidence points the other way. In Resolution 2809 (2025), the Council decided unanimously, with Somalia voting in favour, that UNTMIS shall cease all operations on 31 October 2026 after completing the second phase of its transition (UN Security Council, 2025b). Somalia had also declined in October 2025 to support a Council product on the mission's second phase (The Somali Digest, 2026). With closure only weeks after the October meeting and drawdown already under way, both political and operational feasibility are low.

4.9 D6: *Accountability, Governance, and Resources*

The final request asks the Council to consider measures on Somalia's governance, management of resources, and disinformation, and on the restoration of constitutional order (Garowe Online, 2026). The Council can address governance in its products, but binding accountability measures against a member-state government that sits on the Council face very low political feasibility. A narrower, more attainable step is an independent investigation of the contested 3 September Doolow strike, which a separate opposition letter to the Council also requested (The Somali Digest, 2026).

4.10 *The Council Decision Calendar*

Table 3. Fixed Security Council decision points relevant to the letter

Date	Decision point	Relevant request
Oct-26	Council deliberations on Somalia (presidency: Greece)	All (D1–D6)
31-Oct-26	UNTMIS ceases all operations (Res. 2809)	D1, D5
30-Nov-26	Intended review of the Panel of Experts; authority to intercept arms at sea lapses	D3, D4
31-Dec-26	AUSSOM authorisation, Panel of Experts mandate, and Somalia's Council term all expire	D2, D3, D4

Sources: UN Security Council (2025a, 2025b); The Somali Digest (2026); APA (2026).

5. DISCUSSION

5.1 *Principal Findings*

The letter is best understood as an act of sub-state diplomacy aimed at shaping the Council's understanding of Somalia's crisis, rather than as a package of requests likely to be adopted. Its framing is coherent: it defines the crisis as a threat to the federal order, attributes it to Mogadishu, presents Puntland as a responsible security partner, and asks the Council to act. Its requests, however, run against decisions the Council has already taken and against the preferences of a government that holds a Council seat. The most attainable outcomes are Council support for mediated dialogue (D1) and a stronger Panel of Experts at the December renewal (D3).

5.2 *Interpretation in Light of Theory*

The findings fit Keating's (1999) account of regional diplomacy as shaped by opportunity structures: Puntland timed its letter to the Council's October deliberations, addressed the penholder, and widened its audience to the



African Union and IGAD. The securitising move identified in Section 4.2 is the mechanism by which an internal constitutional dispute is presented as a matter for the Council (Buzan et al., 1998). The conditional exit signal connects to Coggins's (2011) argument that external powers' positions are decisive for secessionist outcomes: by signalling that exclusion could fuel independence demands, Puntland raises the stakes for actors committed to Somalia's territorial integrity, while stopping short of a claim it could not sustain. The findings are also consistent with analyses that link Puntland's growing assertiveness to its counter-terrorism role and the resulting rift with Mogadishu (Small Wars Journal, 2025).

5.3 Policy Implications

For the Security Council: prioritise support for an inclusive, mediated dialogue on an electoral roadmap; use the December 2026 sanctions renewal to restore the Panel of Experts' capacity to monitor arms diversion; and support an independent investigation of contested airstrikes.

For the Federal Government of Somalia: engage with member-state grievances through a consensus-based process, and increase transparency over weapons deliveries and resource agreements to reduce allegations of diversion.

For Puntland: pair its appeal with concrete, sequenced proposals the Council can realistically adopt, and maintain its stated commitment to a federal Somalia as the basis for international support.

5.4 Limitations

The study relies on a single primary document and on publicly available sources, and cannot access internal Council negotiations or federal deliberations. Several of the letter's allegations remain unverified. The analysis was conducted by a single coder, and feasibility ratings involve judgement. Finally, the situation is evolving rapidly, and the Council's October 2026 deliberations may change the picture.

5.5 Future Research

Future research should compare Puntland's appeal with communications from other member states and the opposition to the Council; examine the roles of Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, and Ethiopia in federal–member state relations; and follow the Council's response to test whether sub-state appeals influence Council products.

6. CONCLUSION

Puntland's 13 September 2026 letter is a pivotal document in Somalia's federal crisis. It frames the dispute as a matter of state survival, positions Puntland as a defender of the federal constitutional order, and asks the Security Council to act on six fronts. Measured against the Council's existing decisions, most of these requests have low feasibility: UNTMIS is scheduled to close on 31 October 2026, the arms embargo on the federal government was lifted in 2023, and Somalia sits on the Council for every decision at stake. Support for mediated dialogue and a strengthened Panel of Experts remain realistic entry points.

The letter's significance therefore lies less in the likelihood of its requests being adopted than in how it seeks to define Somalia's crisis for international audiences. If its conditional exit signal is ignored, the risk is continued fragmentation that could undermine hard-won gains against al-Shabaab and the Islamic State. A phased approach that prioritises dialogue, strengthens monitoring, and investigates contested uses of force offers the most viable path forward.

DECLARATIONS

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used Claude (Anthropic) to assist with the literature search. The authors reviewed and verified all content and take full responsibility for it.

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Appendix A. Document Corpus

Category	Documents	Use in analysis
Primary document	Puntland letter to the UN Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (13 September 2026)	Framing analysis (RQ1); identification of requests
Security Council decisions	Resolutions 2714 (2023), 2806 (2025), 2809 (2025)	Feasibility assessment (RQ2)
Official statements	Somalia MFA press statement (4 April 2024); UN press conference (September 2026)	Context and verification
News and analysis	Garowe Online; Hiiraan Online; Horseed Media; The Somali Digest; ChimpReports; Somali News Today; Dawan Africa; The East African; The Standard; APA	Verification of the letter's content, dates, and reception
Scholarly and policy literature	Bowen (2009); Buzan et al. (1998); Coggins (2011); Cornago (2010); Dahir (2021); Entman (1993); Hagmann & Stepputat (2023); Hashi & Barasa (2023); Keating (1999); Small Wars Journal (2025); SPA & PDRC (2025)	Theoretical framework and literature review

Appendix B. Coding Frame

Framing function (Entman, 1993)	Sub-codes	Coding rule
Problem definition	Federal erosion; mandate expiry; parallel government	Text identifying what is wrong and for whom
Causal diagnosis	Centralisation; arming of rivals; partner-supplied firepower; resource concessions	Text attributing responsibility for the problem
Moral evaluation	Reliable CT partner; counter-piracy; federal loyalty; FGS as spoiler	Text assigning credit, blame, or legitimacy
Remedy	D1–D6	Text asking an actor to take a specific action
Overarching frame	Securitisation; conditional exit signal	Text linking the dispute to survival or international security

Appendix C. CARDA Reporting Map

CARDA element	Where reported
Research question and rationale	Sections 1.2–1.3
Theoretical framing	Section 2.5
Document selection and corpus	Section 3.2; Appendix A
Authenticity and credibility of documents	Section 3.4
Analytic approach and coding	Section 3.3; Appendix B
Reflexivity and limitations	Sections 3.4 and 5.4