Factors Influencing Compliance Decisions in Tanzania's Petroleum Downstream Sector: An Integrated Model of Organizational, Regulatory, and Economic Drivers
Keywords:
regulatory compliance, petroleum downstream sector, petroleum product quality, petroleum infrastructure standards, compliance cost, economic incentives, TanzaniaAbstract
Despite a comprehensive legal and institutional framework governing petroleum product quality and infrastructure standards in Tanzania's downstream petroleum sector, compliance among regulated entities remains uneven. This study examines factors associated with compliance decisions among Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) and petrol station operators, drawing on Goal Framing Theory, Deterrence Theory, Institutional Theory, and Compliance Theory. Using a quantitative cross-sectional survey of 284 respondents,comprising petrol station operators, OMC representatives, and regulatory officials from EWURA, TBS, PBPA, and WMA,the study employs multiple regression and PROCESS macro mediation/moderation analyses. Findings indicate that internal organizational characteristics, external regulatory characteristics, compliance cost, and economic incentives are all significantly associated with compliance decisions, with compliance cost (negative association) and economic incentives (positive association) exerting the strongest effects. Compliance cost and economic incentives partially mediate the relationships between organizational/regulatory factors and compliance decisions, while industry maturity moderates the compliance cost–compliance relationship but not the economic incentive–compliance relationship. The study contributes a context-specific, integrated model of perceived compliance behavior in a developing-country petroleum downstream sector and recommends that regulators recalibrate the balance between enforcement and compliance cost, strengthen regulatory clarity, and apply differentiated, economics-aware strategies to improve compliance.
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